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l use suThis article develops and tests a theory to explain the common ten-
dency to “denigrate heroes,” whereby high-status actors are suspected
of being inconsiderate and inauthentic relative to low-status coun-
terparts. This tendency is argued to reﬂect two conditions typical of
status attainment processes: ðaÞ assertions of superiority over others
and ðbÞ the presence of incentives to pursue status. The latter is key
since awareness of such incentives breeds suspicions of inauthentic-
ity, which in turn undermine perceptions of prosocial intentions. This
theory is validated in a series of online experiments, in which cate-
gorical status hierarchies emerge either via deference on a coordinated
task or via competitive interactions. Results show that high-status
actors may also be “celebrated” as authentic and considerate when the
observable incentive structure is such that assertions of superiority
appear as unintended by-products of prosocial action. Implications
are drawn regarding the sources of instability and insecurity in status
hierarchies.INTRODUCTION
One of the bedrock observations of sociological research on status hier-
archies is that such hierarchies are recognized and legitimized not only byauthors would like to thank Shelley Correll, Julia DiBenigno, Sara Jordan-Bloch,
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Denigration of Heroesthe high-status actors who beneﬁt from their position but even by the low-
status actors who do not ðTreiman 1977; see also Chase 1980; Jost and
Burgess 2000; Lee and Fiske 2006Þ. Indeed, this must be the case; were
low-status actors to ðpubliclyÞ disagree with their placement in the hierar-
chy, there would be no hierarchy—only multiple groups exhibiting greater
regard for their own group than others. Accordingly, insofar as low-status
actors do accept their position in the hierarchy despite the strong incen-
tives to assert a higher position, it would seem that the status hierarchy is
an undeniable social fact ðAnderson et al. 2012Þ, one which all actors ac-
cept even when it is injurious to them. As such, status hierarchies necessar-
ily entail the public “celebration of heroes” ðGoode 1978Þ, and this cele-
bration is joined by members of the public whose nonhero status is thereby
reinforced.
But especially when considered from this perspective, an underrecognized
theme in recent sociological and psychological research seems puzzling: the
tendency for actors throughout the status hierarchy to question the moral
character of high-status actors. Lamont’s ð2000Þ interview study is instruc-
tive, as it captures the two related themes that are broadly represented in
past research. The most common complaint about high-status actors is that
they are inconsiderate or cold toward others ðFiske et al. 2002; Judd et al.
2005; Ridgeway and Correll 2006Þ. An interviewee of Lamont’s, a car me-
chanic, levels this accusation when he laments, “When you get the almighty
dollar, you hate to lose it. So you step on somebody’s feet, or somebody’s
hand, or somebody’s head to make sure you stay on top, which is not the
greatest thing in the world” ðLamont 2000, p. 108Þ. A second charge, which
appears less prominently in past research ðbut see Halle 1996; Fine 2003;
Zukin 2008Þ is that high-status actors are inauthentic or insincere. As an-
other informant of Lamont’s, a ﬁreﬁghter, puts it when asked about high-
status elites, “Oh!Youknowwhat I hate?Two-face. I can’ t stand that.You’re
a fake, you’re a fake.Why be a fake?” ðLamont 2000, p. 109Þ. But insofar as
high-status actors are often viewed as inconsiderate and inauthetic, why do
we often denigrate the very heroes that are publicly celebrated?
This question demands sociological attention for two reasons. First,
some theories of status rule out, by deﬁnition, the possibility that high-
status actors could be denigrated for low moral character ðe.g., Fragale,
Overbeck, and Neale 2011Þ. This might seem intuitive given that high-
status actors often earn status speciﬁcally because of their “prosocial” be-
havior ðWiller 2009Þ, as exempliﬁed by such moral heroes as Raoul Wal-Working Group at MIT, and participants at the American Sociological Association con-
ference session on group processes for their comments and discussion on earlier drafts.
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Allenberg or Mother Teresa. On the other hand, the fact that demonstrations
of moral virtue can be the basis for high status, and that public demon-
strations of low morals tend to threaten a status position ðAdut 2008;
Grafﬁn et al. 2013Þ, does not mean that status cannot be achieved via mor-
ally neutral or even morally questionable ways, as long as the moral viola-
tions are ambiguous. Consistent with this point, research has shown that
perceptions of moral character can vary for occupations that occupy equiv-
alent positions in the occupational status hierarchy ðBrambilla et al. 2010Þ.
More generally, evidence of high-status denigration combined with the con-
tingent link between attributions of status and morality suggest that we
deﬁne status strictly as public rank achieved for performing valued ser-
vices for a particular audience or community ðsee Homans 1961, p. 339; cf.
Ridgeway 1982; Phillips, Turco, and Zuckerman 2013Þ. This deﬁnition al-
lows us to ask the question of why and under what conditions the attribu-
tion of status and of moral character will move in the same direction and
when they will not.
Second, it is particularly puzzling that high-status actors themselves
seem to regard their own category of actors as less considerate and sincere.
That is, it is not particularly surprising to hear such sentiment from low-
status actors, such as were interviewed by Lamont ð2000Þ. Such sentiment
could be dismissed as based on “sour grapes” by the losers in status com-
petition, and it may be particularly unsurprising to hear such sentiment
expressed privately and with respect to dimensions of value that are highly
subjective. But in many cases, it is not only low-status actors who regard
high-status actors as inconsiderate and inauthentic. Experimental research
ðsee Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, and Judd 2010Þ dem-
onstrates that subjects who are experimentally manipulated to see them-
selves as a member of the more competent, higher status of two social
categories tend to regard their own social category as lacking in “consider-
ateness” or warmth toward others. In addition, a wide range of research
suggests that high-status actors often consume cultural goods or afﬁliate
with cultural practices associated with low-status groups and that the
appeal of such displays seems to stem from the observation that these
activities can increase an actor’s perceived authenticity ðe.g., Bryson 1996;
Halle 1996;Martin 1998; Grounds 2001;Grazian 2005Þ. Evidence that even
high-status actors often suspect that actors from their own high-status cat-
egory are inferior on these dimensions suggests that there may be something
systematic in the tendency for high-status actors to be considered morally
suspect. That is, just as low-status actors must acknowledge the undeniable
reality of their low-status position, in some contexts there appears to be
something undeniable about the low moral standing of high-status actors.
And note in this regard that the denigration of high-status actors occurs506
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Denigration of Heroesspeciﬁcally with respect to moral issues but does not seem to occur on other
dimensions of worth ðsuch as “healthfulness”; see Kervyn et al. 2010Þ.What
is the underlying mechanism that governs whether high-status actors are
celebrated or denigrated on these dimensions of moral character?
In this article, we develop a theory to address this question, and we
present three experimental studies to test our theory. In short, we argue
that two features inherent to the status attainment process raise questions
about a high-status actor’s moral character such that, even without evi-
dence demonstrating morally problematic action, the high-status actor is
ðprivatelyÞ suspected of having gained status in a morally questionable
way. The ﬁrst issue pertains to the incentive structure typically associated
with status attainment; in short, the rewards for attaining high status pro-
duce an incentive to feign one’s capabilities or commitments. This implies
that unless there is objective evidence of the actor’s capabilities and a rea-
son to think that the high-status actor was not motivated by the beneﬁts
afforded him by a high-status position, he will be suspected of being in-
sincere or inauthentic. The second issue pertains to the interaction process
by which status is typically achieved. In particular, status may be achieved
ðand observedÞ either via patterns of deference or through competition,
and each of these interaction processes effectively require that one assert
one’s superiority and others’ inferiority—actions that provide prima fa-
cie evidence that one is selﬁsh and inconsiderate. This implies that unless
there is some additional credible evidence that his motives were “prosocial,”
he will be suspected of being cold or inconsiderate. Furthermore, because
these key features of the status attainment process lead to concerns that
someone who achieves high status is inconsiderate and inauthentic, and
credible prosocial evidence can overcome both of these concerns, this ar-
gument also explains why attributions of considerateness and authenticity
made about high-status actors tend to move in the same direction. Finally,
that denigration ðor celebrationÞ occurs on both dimensions of consider-
ateness and authenticity is a key difference between our theory and previ-
ous work ðe.g., Fiske et al. 2002; Judd et al. 2005Þ.
By introducing this approach, we contribute to the sociological litera-
ture on status by highlighting how tensions inherent to the status attain-
ment process determine whether suspicions are raised about the high-status
actor’smoral character. Furthermore, this theory is general enough to apply
to the two general processes of status attainment discussed in academic
literature on status: ð1Þ patterns of deference in coordination as discussed
in studies on task groups ðsee, e.g., Moore 1968; Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch
1972; Ridgeway 1982Þ, and ð2Þ public competition as discussed in studies on
markets, science, and sports ðsee, e.g., Foote 1951;Geertz 1973;Goode 1978;
Merton 1968Þ.507
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AlIn the next two sections, we present our argument more fully and test it
through a series of experiments that build on the main experiment in
Ridgeway and Correll ð2006Þ. These experiments, which induce identi-
ﬁcation with two arbitrary social types based on the “minimal group”
paradigm, serve both to validate our argument and to cast doubt on the
prominent explanation for this phenomenon in the ﬁeld of social psy-
chology—that the tendency to denigrate high-status actors derives from a
psychological motivation to “compensate” low-status actors by regarding
them as more virtuous ðJudd et al. 2005; Yzerbyt, Kervyn, and Judd 2008Þ.
While much previous evidence related to the denigration phenomenon has
focused on the negative relationship between status and considerateness,
we use these studies to validate our claim that denigration also exists for
a high-status actors’ perceived authenticity. In three experiments covering
both general processes of status attainment ðtask group coordination or
public competitionÞwe vary the means by which status is attained ðneutral
or prosocialÞ and the prominence of incentives for performance to show
that whether the high-status actor’s moral character is celebrated ðor
denigratedÞ hinges on the existence ðor absenceÞ of prosocial behavior and
the absence ðor existenceÞ of ulterior motives for performance in the at-
tainment process.THEORY: THE SUSPICIOUSNESS OF STATUS ATTAINMENT
Our theory is designed to explain why suspicions about the moral standing
of high-status actors are common, and when such suspicions are overcome
such that high-status actors achieve high moral standing. Our focus is on
situations where a high-status actor is publicly validated as being high
status based on their relative performance and there is no evidence that it
has behaved in a problematic way. Under these conditions, we wish to
understand the conditions under which community members may pri-
vately suspect high-status actors of being cold and inauthentic, and when
such suspicions are overcome.
In developing this theory, we build on a basic tenet of sociological re-
search on status, whereby status is conferred upon actors who have been
publicly acknowledged for their superior performance or service to a com-
munity or audience due to the inference that such actors must be more
competent and committed than others ðsee Homans 1961; Ridgeway 1982;
Correll and Benard 2006; Phillips et al. 2013Þ. At ﬁrst blush, this tenet
would seem logically incompatible with a tendency to suspect high-status
actors as morally compromised. After all, if an actor has been validated as
more competent and more committed to serving the audience and its val-
ues, this implies that it deserves higher moral standing. Under these con-508
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Denigration of Heroesditions, the only possible explanation for denigrating such heroes would
seem to involve attributing a motivation on the part of social observers to
cast suspicion where there is no evidence for it. Note that any motivation-
based theory must address the following issues: ðiÞ why denigration seems
to occur speciﬁcally with respect to the dimensions of considerateness and
authenticity, but not other dimensions of worth such as “healthfulness”
ðKervyn et al. 2010Þ; ðiiÞhow considerateness and authenticity are related to
one another; and ðiiiÞ why high-status actors are often celebrated for their
moral virtuousness rather than denigrated. Our theory is designed to ad-
dress each of these issues.
In short, we argue that when social observers assess social actors, they
pay attention not only to which actors have been socially validated as com-
mitted or capable, but how such status was attained. On the one hand, if the
process of attainment provides objective evidence of the actor’s superior
capability and her superior commitment to serving the community and its
values, then there is no reason for anyone to suspect high-status actors as
being cold or inauthentic. To the contrary; such actors should be celebrated
even by low-status actors. If this were not the case, there would be no such
thing as a legitimate organizational hierarchy, whereby those in subordi-
nate positions are happy to defer to the decisions of superordinates because
they recognize their leaders as capable and committed to their interests.
But on the other hand, many organizational hierarchies suffer from deﬁcits
of legitimacy precisely because subordinates have evidence to suspect that
their superiors are not as competent or as committed as is suggested by
their status ðsee Burke 1968; Gallagher and Burke 1974Þ, perhaps owing to
a promotion process that falls short of meritocratic ideals.
But the presence of social suspicion about high-status actors is not a
mystery under such conditions. Thus, let us conﬁne ourselves to situations
where there is no evidence that there is anything broken about the status
attainment process. For instance, suppose that status has been attained via
higher performance according to an ostensibly transparent, meritocratic
process and that social observers have no evidence that high-status actors
are less authentic, more inconsiderate, or more generally, that they are any
less committed to serving the audience and the values it upholds. Why
might social suspicions arise under these conditions?
The answer, we suggest, derives from two basic features of the status
attainment process. The ﬁrst and most general of these two features pertains
to the incentive structure typically associated with status attainment. In
short, the issue is that the achievement of high status tends to confer sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts on the high-status actor, including greater access to re-
sources and greater returns for a given input ðMerton 1968; Podolny 2005;
Correll et al. 2012; Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012Þ. Accordingly, even509
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Although audiences will confer higher status on those who are capable and
committed to that audience rather than themselves, the beneﬁts of high
status constitute an incentive to seek and preserve status even when one’s
status is not deserved. This raises questions regarding high-status actors:
How does an audience know that a high-performing actor’s performance
was not faked in some way? How does an audience know that such a
performer’s apparent commitment to serving the audience is not a tempo-
rary matter of expedience, due to the beneﬁts associated with recognition
as high status?
The ﬁrst question is often quite difﬁcult to resolve ðe.g., doping in sportsÞ;
but as long as the competition seems fair, there is certainly no reason to
suspect the high-status actor as less capable than the low-status actor. The
second question is even more challenging because actors’ intentions with
respect to an audience involve unobservable mental states, which can
change quickly. Insofar as it promises beneﬁts to the holder, the very at-
tainment of status fosters suspicion regarding the high-status actor’s ulte-
rior motives for achieving high levels of performance. And the contrast
with low-status actors is key. Since low-status actors performed relatively
poorly, one can hardly suspect them of being overly motivated by the fruits
of a high-status position. But if there is anyone who is driven by such self-
interested motives, they would seem to occupy the ranks of the high status.
Thus, there is good reason for social suspicion about the authenticity of
high-status actors to lurk.
This line of reasoning leads to the following general proposition:
PROPOSITION A. Unless there is credible evidence that the high-status actor had
prosocial rather than self-interested motivations, observers will regard high-
status actors as more insincere or inauthentic than lower-status actors.
The second feature of status attainment processes that raises questions
about high-status actors’ moral character pertains to the interaction pro-
cesses by which status is achieved. Status hierarchies may emerge in one of
two ways: ðaÞ deference patterns in coordination and ðbÞ public competi-
tion. The ﬁrst of these interaction processes is that which has traditionally
been studied in task groups ðsee, e.g., Moore 1968; Berger et al. 1972;
Ridgeway 1982Þ; the second is that which has traditionally been studied in
markets, science, and sports ðsee, e.g., Foote 1951; Geertz 1973; Goode
1978Þ.
In the ﬁrst set of contexts, status hierarchies emerge when two or more
actors coordinate with one another and they must decide on a joint course
of action. In such a context, as classically studied in the small groups
literature ðe.g., Ridgeway 1981, 1982; Ridgeway and Correll 2006; An-
derson and Kilduff 2009; Anderson et al. 2012Þ, a status hierarchy often
emerges as a means to coordinate decisions. In particular, such a hierarchy510
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Denigration of Heroesemerges insofar as one actor ðiÞ makes public claims of superiority
ðindirectly, by advocating for her preferred course of actionÞ over another
actor ð jÞ, and a reciprocal acknowledgment of inferiority is made by j
ðindirectly, by yielding to i’s suggestionÞ. Such interaction patterns are
basic to the emergence of a clearly recognized status hierarchy in groups
and are unremarkable in that respect. But they are also morally prob-
lematic in that actor imust effectively take action that causes a loss of face
or respectability on the part of j ðGoffman 1955; Ho 1976Þ. In short, actor i
may achieve high status in this way, but she also acts in a way that in the
ﬁrst instance signals a lack of care for someone else’s dignity. We argue
that it is this assertion of superiority and others’ inferiority that lies at the
heart of the accusation that the high-status actor is “cold” ðe.g., Fiske et al.
2002; Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007Þ or “inconsiderate” ðRidgeway and
Correll 2006Þ. To the extent that there is no evidence to counteract this
concern, those who attain high-status positions will be suspected of being
inconsiderate.
This line of reasoning leads to a second general proposition:
PROPOSITION B. In a situation where one actor consistently defers to a second
actor, unless the target of deference ðTODÞ engages in credible prosocial efforts
to afﬁrm the dignity of the deferring party, social observers will not only regard
theTODas higher status andmore inauthentic but also regard theTODasmore
inconsiderate than the deferring party.
One might suppose that suspicions of inconsiderateness and inauthen-
ticity would not extend to the second set ðbÞ of contexts where status
hierarchies emerge, that is, through public competition such as in sports or
in scientiﬁc competition. Certainly, this should be the case insofar as ð1Þ the
competition is structured in a fair manner, and ð2Þ the public loss of face by
the loser is an unavoidable side effect of the high-status actor’s efforts to
achieve a socially desirable performance. Whether the competition is held
in the realms of athletics or science, beating the competition is a sign that
one has greater competence or greater commitment to serving the public
who seek great athletic or scientiﬁc achievement. But it is notable that
despite the moral legitimacy of winning in such cases, social observers are
highly sensitive to how the winner conducts himself during and after the
competition. For example, consider the aftermath of a home run in base-
ball.2 There is a very strict protocol for how the batter must behave. In
particular, the norm is for the batter to trot quickly around the base paths
so as not to prolong the pitcher’s humiliation and to keep his head down
and avoid eye contact with the pitcher, thus avoiding the suggestion that
he is gloating. And note that while showboating and boasting are more
prominent features in other sports, every sport has a normative line that2We thank an anonymous AJS reviewer for suggesting that we consider this example.
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Aldistinguishes acceptable celebrating from unacceptable actions that cause
an opponent to lose face ðe.g., Eitzen 2001; cf. Goffman 1955Þ.
These observations suggest that while victory per se does not cause
suspicions of inconsiderateness and inauthenticity, it raises the risk of such
suspicions in a way that defeat necessarily does not; the onus is placed on
the high-status actor to avoid any action that might threaten the dignity of
the low-status actor, else he be suspected of being inconsiderate and in-
authentic, in that he presented himself as pursuing the social value from
the competition when he in fact sought to humiliate his rival. Put differ-
ently, we argue that under the surface of such competitions, there are two
competing reasons why a competitor might seek to defeat his rival: ðaÞ to
achieve a performance that fulﬁlls the values for which the competition is
publicly justiﬁed, whereby the defeat of the rival is a side effect; and ðbÞ the
humiliation of that rival. Accordingly, insofar as the social value of a
competition may be greater or lower, such variation implies correspond-
ingly different implications for suspicions of considerateness as well as for
authenticity. In particular:
PROPOSITION C. In a situation where status distinctions emerge from public
competition, suspicions of coldness and inauthenticity of the victor turn on the
extent to which the competition has recognized social value. Insofar as the com-
petition has ðnoÞ recognized social value, social observers will regard the victor
not only as ðinÞauthentic but also as ðinÞconsiderate.
Finally, a key empirical implication of this argument is that, inasmuch
as high-status denigration is driven by inferences made about the status
attainment process, attributions of considerateness and authenticity will
be positively correlated. Thus far, we have argued that the incentives and
interaction process inherent to status attainment lead to questions about a
high-status actor’s considerateness and authenticity, unless this attainment
is coupled with credible evidence that motives for such attainment were
prosocial in nature. The idea that these features cause concern over the
high-status actor’s moral character relies on the premise that the audience
makes inferences about what motivates these actors to attain status. The
actual motivations for actors are difﬁcult to ascertain because it would in-
volve knowing unobservable mental states. Instead, audience members can
be expected to rely on signals associated with these motivations. As it is
difﬁcult to distinguish whether the actor is motivated by pure intentions,
is faking their commitment, or is driven by defeating another, these signals
serve as the evidence for such inferences. Each type of suspicion—that
high-status actors lack considerateness and that they lack authenticity—is
triggered because the high-status actor beneﬁts from the relative under-
performance of another. Each type of suspicion can be overcome via cred-
ible prosocial signals. Furthermore, to the extent that denigration relies on
comparing general expectations about high-status actors with those of512
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Denigration of Heroeslower-status counterparts, evidence that the high-status actor is lacking on
one of these dimensions ðconsiderateness or authenticityÞ should also in-
crease concern about the other ðauthenticity or consideratenessÞ. Accord-
ingly, we propose the following:
PROPOSITION D. Attributions about the high-status actor’s considerateness will
be positively correlated with attributions of his authenticity, regardless of whether
correlations between these two attributes are negatively correlated with status or
when ðcredible prosocial behavior means thatÞ they are positively correlated.STUDIES AND RESULTS
Empirical Overview
We designed three experiments to test our argument that suspicions raised
by status attainment inﬂuence whether the moral character of high-status
actors is celebrated or denigrated. Many related studies use a stereotype ap-
proach to understand the conditions under which status is related to lack of
warmth ðe.g., Fiske et al. 2002; Fragale et al. 2011Þ. They provide subjects
with a series of occupations or even people in their network with different
levels of status and ask them to explain their perceptions of these people.
However, informational cues related tomode of attainment are often embed-
ded in the speciﬁc individuals considered and the occupations asked about.
As such, these studies cannot explain what drives the fact that high-status
actors are at times denigrated and at times celebrated, nor is it the objective
of the authors of these studies to do so. Instead, our approach was to limit
these cues, which allows us to separate the effect of information on mode of
attainment from the perceived status of the actor and other key variables. In
these studies we do manipulate relative performance and ask subjects to
evaluate the actors on perceived status, authenticity, and considerateness
with the ultimate goal being to observe differences in these attributions across
high and low performers.
In the three experiments we employ, we vary signals of performance
either through patterns of deference in a task situation ðstudies 1 and 2Þ or
via objective measures of performance in a competitive situation ðstudy 3Þ.
The two key variables manipulated across all three studies are the amount
of prosocial behavior exhibited by the higher performer and the incentives
for performance. We ﬁrst investigate the effects of status attainment as
observed through patterns of deference, a general process through which
status hierarchies are formed ðGould 2002Þ. Study 1 is a near replication of
the study in Ridgeway and Correll ð2006, p. 444Þ, in which they show that
the higher-performing social type ðrevealed via deference to a member’s
assertions of greater competenceÞ is regarded as more competent and
higher status but also as less considerate. In addition to anchoring our ex-
perimental paradigm in prior literature, study 1 features two novel results513
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Althat help validate our approach: ðaÞ that members of a high-performing
social type are not only denigrated for being inconsiderate but also for
being inauthentic, and ðbÞ that evidence of prosocial behavior nulliﬁes this
effect.
In study 2, we show that the basis for denigration is a matter not only of
observed behavior but also of the incentives for such behavior; accord-
ingly, the tendency to denigrate returns when there is an ulterior motive for
prosocial behavior. In study 3, we examine how concerns about status
attainment may arise even where objective relative performance in a
competitive situation is the basis for attributions of status. This study, in
which we vary the publicity of the performance and the recognized social
value of the outcome of the competition, extends the lessons from the ﬁrst
two studies and deepens our understanding of the mechanisms involved.
Each of the three studies was designed to test speciﬁc hypotheses derived
from the propositions discussed above. For each study, we ðaÞ compare
attributions of considerateness and authenticity between high- and low-
performing social types, ðbÞ present pairwise correlations between attri-
butions of considerateness and authenticity, and ðcÞ present the ðwithin-
subjectÞ differences in attributions of ðiÞ status and considerateness and
ðiiÞ status and authenticity. For study 3, we perform an additional media-
tion analysis to clarify the inferences about motivation that drive denigra-
tion and celebration.Design Description: Studies 1 and 2
The ﬁrst two experiments have a common form and share most aspects
except for each study’s key manipulation. To limit redundancy, we ﬁrst
explain the characteristics and methods used across both of these studies.
We then describe the two studies, separately explaining the manipulations
speciﬁc to each study, the results, and the way each study relates to and
tests our theory.
Introduction.—Subjects were informed that they were to observe the
interaction of a team of three others. Two of the others were assigned the
role of “discussant” and the third was assigned to the “commentator” role.
Subjects were informed that the discussants and commentator were in-
volved in a task in which these actors were to solve a series of problems as
a team and that the subjects should pay close attention to the discussants’
interaction as they came to a decision as a team. To control for potential
gender effects, the discussants were presented as male. Subjects were in-
formed that they would be evaluating the individual team members ðdis-
cussantsÞ based on how much they contributed to the success of the team
overall. The purpose of the “commentator” role will be discussed below.514
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Denigration of HeroesPersonality type assignment.—Before showing them the task, subjects
responded to a test of “personal response style” and were informed that the
discussants each took a similar test. This test was meant to randomly
assign the subject to one of two “personality types”: Q2 or S2. This was
done using the classic Klee and Kandinsky style test paradigm for “mini-
mal group” experiments ðsee Tajfel et al. 1971; Yamagishi and Kiyonari
2000Þ. These studies show that even minimal criteria such as ambiguous
group names cause actors to identify with their own type more than the
other type. Subjects were shown a series of pictures and they were in-
formed, based on their responses, that they ﬁt the proﬁle of either a Q2 type
or an S2 type.3 In addition, the two discussants were presented as a Q2 type
interacting with an S2 type ðsee app. BÞ. Study participants were informed
that “responses to this test have proven to divide the world evenly based
on personality and level of knowledge.”
The ﬁrst manipulation was whether the subject viewed the study
through the eyes of a Q2 or an S2. In each study, the Q2 was designed to
be what we henceforth label the “target of deference” ðimplying higher
performanceÞ and the S2 was designed to be the “deferring party.” And
insofar as subjects tended to ascribe higher ðlowerÞ status to the higher
ðlowerÞ performer, this implies that Q2s would come to regard themselves
as high status whereas S2s would come to see themselves as low status.
This manipulation allowed us to observe the perceptions of individuals
in high-performing categories, those subjects randomly assigned to the tar-
get of deference ðQ2Þ type, who should be least disposed to denigrate that
category.4 Using the minimal group paradigm allowed us not only to ma-
nipulate subjects in this way but also to create general categories or types of
actors ði.e., Q2 or S2Þ that cause subjects to think about stereotypes related
to high performers in the manner presented, as opposed to any other poten-
tially confounding characteristics. Recall that our theoretical discussion
focused on why any audience might consider high-status actors as more
morally suspect than a lower-status counterpart. And we noted that the
fact that even high-status category members often seem to regard their own3After the Klee and Kandinsky assignment portion of the study, subjects were asked to
identify which type of category they ﬁt, Q2 or S2. Subjects who answered incorrectly
were asked to answer the question again until they knew. Only those subjects who
answered this correctly were allowed to continue the task.
4 In app. D, we present and discuss results from subjects assigned to view the task through
the eyes of a member of the S2 ðdeferring partyÞ type, for studies 1 and 2. The results and
discussion in app. D not only show that our results are robust to in-group bias but also
function as a manipulation check in support of our methodological decision ðbased on
Ridgeway and Correll 2006Þ to use the minimal group setup to establish status signals by
“type.”
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Alcategory as inconsiderate and inauthentic ðe.g., Bryson 1996; Halle 1996;
Grounds 2001; Ridgeway and Correll 2006Þ indicated that such “denigra-
tion of heroes” could not be fully explained by in-group bias. Thus, this
manipulation allows us to test our theory while ruling out in-group bias as
an explanation for any ﬁndings.
The task.—Subjects were informed that the “team” had been presented
with a series of “contrast sensitivity tasks” similar to those used in exper-
iments on status construction ðMoore 1968; Berger et al. 1972; Willer and
Walker 2007Þ. This visual task was chosen because it was related to the
previous Q2/S2 assignment and to reinforce the importance of skill as the
basis for evaluating the members of each social category. In these tasks,
subjects were presented with a picture containing 64 squares, with an
equal number of white and black squares distributed throughout the
image. The team’s task was to ﬁgure out whether there were more black
squares or white squares in each of the ﬁve pictures they were shown; in
fact, there were 32 squares of each color, but this fact is very difﬁcult to
ascertain without painstakingly counting the squares. Subjects were in-
formed that the discussants and commentator were given only ﬁve seconds
to react to the picture.
Subjects were also informed that ðaÞ the “discussants” had been tasked
with discussing their answer until they came to a consensus on the “correct”
answer, and ðbÞ the “commentator’s” role was then to either support the
conclusion or ask them to return and deliberate some more. In both studies
1 and 2, the subjects were presented with a text transcript of the supposed
interaction between the discussants and the response of the commenta-
tor. But as with the rest of what the subjects observed, this dialogue was
written by the experimenters. Before they were shown the interaction, the
subjects were reminded to observe the teams interacting as they came to a
decision. It is important to note that the experiments were designed in a
way that the commentator always played the “supportive” role based on
the “supported” conditions in Ridgeway and Correll ð2006Þ. That is, the
commentator never asked the subjects to deliberate some more. This sup-
portive role served as the social validation of deference, making the nas-
cent social hierarchy difﬁcult to deny ðsee Anderson et al. 2012Þ. As Ridge-
way and Correll ð2006Þ show, without this supportive role, or similar social
validation of deference, status hierarchies are unlikely to form.
Dependent variable.—After viewing all ﬁve of the tasks, subjects were
asked to answer a series of eight questions about the two discussant types
observed in the study ðQ2 and S2Þ. We followed Ridgeway and Correll’s
ð2006; cf. Correll et al. 2012Þ approach of asking about the “third-order
beliefs” by asking subjects to “Please answer the next few questions about
how most people would perceive a typical member of each type ðQ2 and
S2Þ?” ðemphasis addedÞ. As a robustness check, we replicated two of the516
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Denigration of Heroesstudies asking the same questions in a “ﬁrst-order” manner: “How would
you rate the typical member of each type?” ðemphasis addedÞ on each of the
criteria. These ﬁndings are presented in appendix E. A comparison between
these results and the corresponding results show that there is essentially no
difference between asking in the third-order or ﬁrst-order manner. This is
consistent with evidence suggesting that in experimental situations sub-
jects generally do not distinguish between what they think and what they
think most people think ðMarks and Miller 1987Þ because “perceptions of
the views of most shape personal beliefs, and personal beliefs bias infer-
ences about others’ views” ðRidgeway and Correll 2006, p. 434Þ.
An additional advantage to focusing on third-order beliefs is that they
are more proximate to social action. As Ridgeway and Correll ð2006; cf.
Correll et al. 2012Þ argue convincingly, such beliefs are at the core of why
social status has “force in social relations” ðp. 434Þ. Even when one does
not believe that actor/group x is more competent than actor/group y, this
still shapes one’s decision making insofar as one believes that key audi-
ences believe ðthat their audiences believe, etc.Þ that it does. Similarly, we
believe that the key question for social coordination is not whether the
subject personally believes that high-status actors are morally virtuous or
not, but whether they think that most others think so. Finally, following
the overall logic of the minimal group paradigm, framing the issue in terms
of third-order beliefs likely directs subjects to stereotypes about categories
of actors instead of loading the Q2 and S2 types with other confounding
characteristics. That all said, appendix E indicates that the results are
robust to the measurement strategy chosen.
The ﬁrst set of three questions ðpresented in random order to the sub-
jectsÞ was related to the status of the actors. Subjects were asked to rate on
a scale of 1 to 7 the levels of prestige, respect, and competence ﬁrst for one
of the types ði.e., Q2 or S2Þ and then repeated for the other type ði.e., S2 or
Q2Þ.5 These are standard questions borrowed from previous studies mea-
suring status in a task-group context ðe.g., Ridgeway and Correll 2006Þ.
Subjects were then asked a second set of four questions ðagain presented in
random orderÞ. Two of these questions were related to the perceived con-
siderateness and the other two were related to the perceived authenticity of
the Q2 ðS2Þ type. Subjects were asked to rate both types ðon a scale of 1 to
7Þ on levels of considerateness and likability ðcombined for the consider-
ateness scoreÞ and sincerity and authenticity ðcombined for the authen-
ticity scoreÞ. For each study, we present the difference in status, consid-
erateness, and authenticity scores between actor types. For example, the5These questions were counterbalanced such that subjects were randomly assigned to
attribute ratings for the Q2 ðS2Þ type ﬁrst and the S2 ðQ2Þ type second.
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Alstatus score was constructed by taking the mean of the prestige, respect,
and competence scores for each subject. Appendix A lists the questions and
the respective Cronbach alphas or correlations for each set of questions
across all three studies.
Subject recruitment.—Subjects were recruited using the Mechanical
Turk tool from the Amazon.com website. They were recruited by prom-
ising payment of 25 cents upon completion of “feedback on a team de-
velopment task.” This tool has been used in experimental research and has
been found to provide a subject pool slightly more educated and techno-
logically savvy than the national average ðBerinsky, Huber, and Lenz
2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011Þ. Since we were looking for
subjects who reﬂected this general audience, rather than an audience with
a speciﬁc set of knowledge or skill, this was an effective way to recruit an
appropriate subject pool.6
The Mechanical Turk tool provides access to many potential subjects
but faces monitoring risk when compared to laboratory settings in uni-
versities. In particular, there is a risk that some subjects are strictly looking
to get the task accomplished and do not pay as close attention to the task,
limiting the effect of a manipulation. In order to conﬁrm that our subjects
paid close enough attention to the task, we asked them a series of attention
questions scattered throughout the study ðMason and Suri 2011Þ. For in-
stance, we would ask which type ðQ2 or S2Þ was initially correct on the
previous answer screen or which type the subject was assigned to based
on art preference. Those who could not answer these questions correctly
were not able to ﬁnish the study and were not included in the results. Also,
those who began the study and did not ﬁnish the status, considerateness,
and authenticity attribution sections were not included in the ﬁnal pool of
subjects.7 These two ﬁltering criteria were not correlated with any condi-
tion in particular, supporting our claim that the ﬁnal pool of subjects used
to test our hypotheses were randomly assigned to their conditions across
these ﬁrst two studies. For instance, in study 1, 11 out of a total of original
56 potential subjects were removed from the sample. Of these, two were
excluded for not answering the attention questions correctly ðindicating
that they were not paying attention to the study and would not be affected
by the speciﬁc condition requirementsÞ. The remaining nine subjects were
not included because they started but did not ﬁnish the study. In study 2,
nine of the original 60 subjects were removed from the sample ðone did6Subjects for this study were limited to the pool of AmazonMechanical Turk participants
from the United States.
7The questions that made up our dependent variable were at the very end of the study.
All subjects who made it as far as these questions ﬁnished the study and were included in
the ﬁnal sample. Nearly all who did not ﬁnish dropped out after the introductory screens.
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Denigration of Heroesnot correctly answer the attention questions, and eight started but did not
ﬁnishÞ.
Tests.—Unless otherwise noted, the key comparison of attributions on
status, considerateness, and authenticity between “discussants” was done
using aWilcoxon signed rank test. In this test, differences in attribution scores
from each subject about each discussant type are compared by ð1Þ calculating
the within-subject difference in attributions, ð2Þ dropping the cases where
there is no difference and ranking the remaining absolute difference scores,
ð3Þ multiplying these rankings by 1 or 21 depending on whether the differ-
ence was positive or negative, and ð4Þ observing whether the distribution of
these differences is higher or lower than zero ðWilcoxon 1945Þ. These tests
are particularly useful for the types of inferences made in this article for
two key reasons. First, these nonparametric tests essentially compare the full
distributions of the results rather than the means. With smaller sample sizes,
this type of test is a more efﬁcient predictor for the type of data we collected.
Second, these tests compare the differences in attributions made within sub-
ject for each social type ðQ2/S2Þ, and as such, these tests avoid the type of
ecological fallacy that occurs when inferences are made about grouped data.
For instance, an alternative approach would be to compare the means of
each attribution for the two social types separately in a test similar to a t-
test. This would risk making individual-level inferences about population-
level measures ðmeansÞ. Instead, our analysis, using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, tests whether the attributions made about each social type ðQ2 or
S2Þ within subject are more likely to be positive ðcelebrationÞ or negative
ðdenigrationÞ. We present the z-score associated with this test as the stan-
dardized difference between Q2 and S2 for each pair of status, considerate-
ness, and authenticity attributions for each actor type.Study 1: Denigration on Considerateness and Authenticity,
and Prosocial Behavior
Purpose.—There are three purposes to this study. The ﬁrst is to validate
our method of establishing status in the lab with prior studies ðe.g., Ridge-
way and Correll 2006Þ. These studies have shown that more assertive ac-
tors are regarded as possessing higher status but being less considerate
than their more deferential counterparts. The second purpose of this study
is to observe, consistent with our theory, whether status attainment leads
to increased suspicions not only of inconsiderateness but also of inauthen-
ticity. The ﬁnal purpose of this study is to observe whether prosocial be-
havior can eliminate this effect of denigration on each of these dimensions
of moral worth.
As discussed in the theory section, one general way through which status
is observed is through patterns of deference when two or more parties519
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Aldirectly coordinate their action and a choice must be made as to whose
ideas or actions are more likely to increase performance ðe.g., Gould 2002Þ.
Such a pattern of deference induces a status hierarchy. In addition, we
expect that even when the target of deference does not act in an incon-
siderate or inauthentic manner, attaining status through deference raises
concerns about the high-status actor’s considerateness and authenticity.
First, because status provides beneﬁts and deference entails the loss of
dignity of the deferring party, then the target of deference beneﬁts from the
loss of dignity of another. This breeds concern that the recipient of def-
erence is inconsiderate. Second, authenticity concerns arise from the fact
that status confers beneﬁts and, with it, an incentive to fake one’s capa-
bility and commitment to the performance. The beneﬁts related to status
position constitute an ulterior motive to perform, resulting in a perceived
commitment to the rewards that ﬂow from high status as opposed to the
group’s performance.
But the fact that the status attainment process raises such concerns does
not mean that they cannot be allayed. All things equal, actors earn status
by engaging in actions that serve the audience conferring such status rather
than by promoting their self-interest, narrowly construed ðWiller 2009Þ.8
Accordingly, when the recipient of deference takes steps to preserve the
dignity of the deferring party ðe.g., by signaling that he regards the de-
ferring party as his equal in capability and commitmentÞ, the high-status
actor acknowledges the current status difference, but he does it in a way
that potentially resolves concerns over the inconsiderate nature of status
attainment. Indeed, by upholding the dignity of the deferring party and
indicating that the target of deference is not motivated by self-interest,
credible prosocial behavior also signals that the target of deference is truly
committed to the audience and the values it espouses. Accordingly, study 1
tests the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Socially validated patterns of deference should result in higher
attributions of status for the target of deference social type ðrelative to the def-
erring social typeÞ, but lower attributions of considerateness and authenticity
ðrelative to the deferring social typeÞ, unless deference is gained through pro-
social behavior.
Description.—The target of deference was designated in this study by
showing one discussant consistently deferring to the superior judgment of
the other discussant whenever there was a disagreement in their initial
guesses, followed by support of this deference by the commentator. Of the
ﬁve interactions, two were set up as initial agreements and three were set
up as initial disagreements. The disagreements were resolved by showing
one discussant ðthe S2Þ deferring to the other discussant ðthe Q2Þ.
8We thank Julia DiBenigno for very helpful input on this point.
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Denigration of HeroesIn the ﬁrst condition ðplain assertiveÞ, we replicated the assertive char-
acter used by Ridgeway and Correll ð2006Þ.9 This actor used short re-
sponses and did not waiver from asserting that his answer was correct. The
commentator was used to help reinforce the nascent status hierarchy. It
was also important that the assertive actor did not come across as mean or
overly rude to create a backlash against his competence claims, as was
found in earlier studies on status construction ðRidgeway and Diekema
1989Þ. In short, the Q2 social type is designed to appear assertive but not
dominating. And the assertive actor is thereby accepted as more competent
in a socially validated way. Previous studies have shown that this type of
assertive, higher-performing actor earns higher levels of status in task
groups ðe.g., Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Anderson and Kilduff 2009Þ. In
the second condition ðprosocial assertiveÞ, we present a dialogue where one
actor is still clearly assertive but uses more prosocial language when com-
manding deference. In order to do this, the target of deference discussant
was portrayed using more supportive words in interacting with the de-
ferring party type discussant. We wrote the dialogue such that the target
of deference could be seen as a sort of teacher ðas in cases of legitimate
organizational hierarchy; e.g., Hodgson 2004Þ and seems to be rooting for
the deferring party to succeed or improve. In this way, the target of def-
erence can be seen as helping the deferring party to save face by both
presenting the implied competence difference as temporary and assuring
the deferring party that he can develop this competence as well. The
deferring party’s dialogue was only minimally changed from the dialogue
in the ﬁrst study. Appendix B compares one example each of the plain
assertive and prosocial assertive styles of interaction.
Results.—Figure 1 shows the results from study 1 in which we compare
the differences in status, considerateness, and authenticity ratings given by
subjects randomly assigned to the target of deference ði.e., Q2Þ type. In the
plain assertive condition, subjects ðN5 21Þ attributed a typical member of
their own type higher status than a typical member of the other type ðz 5
3.78, P < .01Þ, but lower considerateness ðz 5 23.46, P < .01Þ and
authenticity ðz 522.17, P 5 .03Þ than a typical member of the other type.
In the prosocial assertive condition, subjects ðN 5 24Þ attributed a typical
member of their own type higher status than a typical member of the other
type ðz5 2.75, P < .01Þ, but did not attribute signiﬁcantly different levels of
considerateness ðz 5 20.46, P 5 .32Þ or authenticity ðz 5 20.66, P 5 .25Þ
to a typical member of the other type.
Table 1 shows the results of tests on the correlations of these ðdifferences
inÞ attributions. The upper portion of table 1 shows pairwise correlations9Thanks to Shelley Correll, Cecilia Ridgeway, and Sara Jordan-Bloch for feedback on
this experiment in particular.
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FIG. 1.—Study 1: This ﬁgure shows the results of the standardized differences ðz-
scoreÞ in attributions between the “target of deference” and the “deferring party.” The y-
values are z-scores for differences in attributions of status, considerateness, and au-
thenticity. In the condition on the left, the plain-assertive actor that is deferred to is
attributed higher status, but lower considerateness and authenticity. In the condition on
the right, the pro-social-assertive actor that is deferred to is attributed higher status, and
there is no statistical difference in considerateness and authenticity.
American Journal of Sociology
Albetween considerateness and authenticity. In both conditions, considerate-
ness and authenticity are positively correlated in a statistically signiﬁcant
way ðplain assertive r5 .81,P < .01; prosocial assertive r5 .76,P < .01Þ. The
lower portion of table 1 displays two simple ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ
regressions for each condition describing the relationship between the dif-
ferences in status and considerateness ðmodel 1Þ and the differences in status
and authenticity ðmodel 2Þ. In the plain assertive condition, these ðwithin-
subjectÞ differences are negatively correlated. In this condition, greater pos-
itive differences attributed to actor types in status ðtarget of deference > de-
ferring partyÞ were correlated with larger negative differences between actor
types in both considerateness and authenticity ðdeferring party > target of
deferenceÞ. By contrast, there was essentially no statistically signiﬁcant cor-
relation between these differences in the prosocial assertive condition.
Discussion.—These ﬁndings validate our method of constructing status
in the lab by replicating established ﬁndings, particularly by Ridgeway and
Correll ð2006Þ. In both conditions, the assertive social type was attributed
more status than the deferring social type. This replicates the ﬁndings from522
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Alprevious studies ðe.g., Anderson and Kilduff 2009Þ by showing that when
deference is socially validated, status can be attributed to actors who act
more assertively. Consistent with proposition D from above, the attribu-
tions of considerateness and authenticity are positively correlated.
The ﬁrst novel ﬁnding in this study comes from the plain assertive
condition, where denigration of high-status social types is observed. In this
condition, along with lower attributions of considerateness, subjects also
acknowledge that the social types that were attributed higher status are
suspected of being inauthentic, rating these types lower on attributions of
authenticity. While the Wilcoxon tests show that subjects tend to rate the
deferring social types as lower status, but more considerate and more
authentic, the results from the regressions show that these negative attri-
butions were correlated with more positive attributions of status. These
regressions serve as a sort of mediation in that they are inconsistent with
the possibility that attributions of status are not correlated with attribu-
tions of inconsiderateness and inauthenticity. This supports our contention
that, when there are no prosocial signals, attaining status breeds suspicion
of being both inconsiderate and inauthentic.
To be clear, what is particularly novel about this ﬁnding is not showing
that status attainment leads to acknowledgment that the high-status actor
is less considerate but that status attainment also leads to acknowledged
concerns about the authenticity of the high-status actor. Because in study 1
higher performance is implied via one social type’s deference to a more
assertive ðif not dominantÞ other, we acknowledge that it is possible that
attributions of considerateness arise because the interaction style of the
assertive social type is regarded as more cold or inconsiderate. But note
well that there is little reason, based on the observed behavior of the dis-
cussants alone, why a higher-performing social type would be perceived as
less sincere or authentic than the social type deferring to him, unless these
suspicions arise because of status attainment itself. In other words, the ac-
knowledgment, by subjects manipulated to consider themselves as part of
the high-performing social type, that members of their type are not only
higher status and less considerate but also inauthentic, without direct evi-
dence to support such an attribution, supports our theory in that it cannot
be explained by the observed behavior of the actor.
The second key ﬁnding in this study comes from the prosocial assertive
condition. In this condition we eliminated denigration of the target of
deference type by presenting the assertive social type as gaining deference
while acting in a more supportive and prosocial way toward the deferring
social type. This ﬁnding is important because it shows that being assertive
is not always associated with being inconsiderate or inauthentic. However,
it raises an important question about our theory. These ﬁndings might just
indicate that whether a high-status actor is denigrated or celebrated is con-524
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.063 on May 23, 2017 10:05:17 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Denigration of Heroestingent merely on the behavior that these actors display. In study 2, we test
whether denigration can arise even when ðprosocialÞ behavior is held con-
stant, but the context changes such that ulterior motives for performance are
more likely.Study 2: Credibility of Prosocial Signals
Study 1 showed that when deference is gained in a prosocial way, that
there is no denigration of high-status actors. However, this is only a partial
validation of our theory. The results from study 1 might also suggest that
overcoming denigration is merely a matter of behaving in a prosocial man-
ner, which would imply that the features of the status attainment process
are not what drives denigration, but instead denigration would be the result
of observed indicators of moral character. To be sure, such an interpreta-
tion would not explain why attributions of authenticity might move in the
same direction as considerateness. Nonetheless, our theory holds that den-
igration is a response not simply to observed behavior but to the incentive
structure that shapes interpretations of such behavior. In particular, we
argue that even apparently prosocial behavior may be regarded as inau-
thentic if there is an apparent ulterior motive for engaging in such behavior.
And if the presence of such an ulterior motive casts doubt on the selﬂess-
ness behind the apparent prosocial behavior, it will both resurrect suspi-
cions of inconsiderateness and make salient the question of the high-status
actor’s authenticity ðsee Ridgeway 1981, p. 335,; 1982Þ. We thus test the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2. When observers have evidence that the targets of deference ðdo
notÞ have a private incentive to engage in prosocial behavior, this behavior
loses ðgainsÞ credibility and observers thereby regard the targets of deference
as both ðneitherÞ inconsiderate and ðnorÞ inauthentic.
Description.—In this study, we continue to use the prosocial assertive
dialogue between the discussants as introduced in study 1. The main ma-
nipulation in this study, as displayed in appendix C, was to create two con-
ditions that varied on the team members’ knowledge of incentives for pro-
social behavior. In each condition, subjects were presented with the same
setup as in the previous study but were informed that along with rewards
for correct answers team members would also receive a “teamwork bonus.”
Subjects in the no incentives condition were informed that the teams ðdis-
cussants and commentatorÞwere not aware of this bonus. By letting the sub-
jects know that the teams were not aware of an incentive, we strengthen the
belief that there was no ulterior motive in acting in a prosocial way. In the
incentives condition subjects were informed that teams were aware of this
bonus. It is important to point out that inserting an incentive is not evi-525
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Aldence that the prosocial behavior was indeed motivated by self-interest. In-
stead, by telling the subjects that the incentives were known, this condition
aims to create a clear ulterior motive for engaging in prosocial behavior, but
no change in actual behavior.
Results.—Figure 2 shows the results from study 2 in which we compare
the status, considerateness, and authenticity ratings given by subjects ran-
domly assigned to the target of deference type. This ﬁgure shows the results
of the standardized differences ðz-scoreÞ in attributions between the “target of
deference” and the “deferring party.” The y-values are the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test z-scores for differences in attributions of status, considerateness,
and authenticity. In the incentives condition, subjects ðN 5 26Þ still attrib-
uted a typical member of their own type more status than the other group ðz
5 2.70, P < .01Þ, attributed essentially the same levels of considerateness to
both types ðz521.47,P5 .14Þ, and clearly less authenticity ðz522.82,P <
.01Þ to the typical member of their own type compared to the other type. InFIG. 2.—Study 2: Deference with prosocial interaction. This ﬁgure shows the results of
the standardized differences ðz-scoreÞ in attributions between the “target of deference” and
the “deferring party.” The y-values are z-scores for differences in attributions of status,
considerateness, and authenticity. In each of these conditions there are clear patterns of
deference combined with the target of deference acting more prosocial or supportive to the
deferring party. In theﬁrst condition,where incentives for prosocial behavior ða “teamwork
bonus”Þ are known by the discussants in the study, the study participant attributes higher
levels of status to the target of deference and no difference in considerateness between
the two, but lower levels of authenticity to the target of deference. In the second condition,
where the subject is informed that the incentives for prosocial behavior are unknownby the
“team members,” they attribute higher levels of status to the target of deference, but there
is no difference in attributions of considerateness or authenticity.
526
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Denigration of Heroesthe no incentives condition, those subjects who were informed they were a
“target of deference” type ðN5 25Þ attributed a typical member of their own
type more status than a typical member of the other type ðz5 3.76, P < .01Þ
and attributed a typical member of their own type essentially the same
considerateness ðz5 0.78, P5 .44Þ and authenticity ðz5 0.97, P5 .33Þ as a
typical member of the other type.
Table 2 shows the results of tests on the correlations of these ðdifferences
inÞ attributions. The upper portion of table 2 shows pairwise correlations
between considerateness and authenticity. In both conditions, consider-
ateness and authenticity are positively correlated in a statistically signiﬁ-
cant way ðincentives r 5 .53, P < .01; no incentives r 5 .48, P < .01Þ. The
lower portion of table 2 shows two simple OLS regressions for each con-
dition describing the relationship between the differences in status and
considerateness ðmodel 1Þ and the differences in status and authenticity
ðmodel 2Þ. In the incentives condition, these differences are negatively cor-
related. In this condition, greater positive differences attributed to social
types in status ðtarget of deference > deferring partyÞ were correlated with
larger negative differences between actor types in both considerateness and
authenticity ðdeferring party > target of deferenceÞ. By contrast, there was
essentially no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between these differences
in the no incentives condition.
Discussion.—The ﬁrst important ﬁnding comes from the incentives con-
dition. In this condition, the higher-performing type is once again den-
igrated. By inserting a clear incentive for prosocial behavior, the very same
behavior that overcame some of the denigration concerns in study 1 is ren-
dered ineffective. By holding behavior constant and instead changing the
context in which status through prosocial behavior is attained, we show
that simply acting in a prosocial manner is not enough to overcome the con-
cerns related to the status attainmentprocess.This result clearly supports our
theory. The presence of a potential ulterior motive for these prosocial dis-
plays not only raises suspicion about the authenticity of the target of defer-
ence social type; in so doing, it causes audiences to attribute lower levels of
considerateness to the target of deference social type using these inauthen-
tic means of attaining deference. When actions meant to resolve the de-
fault impression that high-performing actors are cold may be understood as
springing from self-interested motives, these displays are at best ineffective
signals; and at worst, they portray the actor who beneﬁts from attaining
deference as a cold and calculating person.
The next important ﬁnding is that there is validity to our interpretation
of the mechanism behind concern for authenticity in particular: an ulterior
motive for performance. In the incentives condition, the target of deference
social types are more highly denigrated on authenticity than on consider-
ateness. When ulterior motives are highlighted for subjects, they readily527
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Denigration of Heroesmake inferences about the lack of sincerity of the high-status actor’s per-
formance. The implications for considerateness are indirect and somewhat
weaker.
Posttest.—While these results indicate a negative correlation between
attributions of status and attributions of considerateness and authenticity
when incentives for performance are clear to the audience, we have still
not provided evidence that those social types attributed higher status are
“denigrated,” as would be consistent with our theory. It might be the case
that the difference in attributions is the result of the deferring party being
celebrated rather than the target of deference being denigrated, which our
theory predicts. By comparing scores for considerateness and authenticity
across conditions, we can see if there is a drop in considerateness and au-
thenticity for the target of deference ðhigh-status denigrationÞ or an in-
crease in considerateness and authenticity for the deferring party ðlow-
status celebrationÞ as a result of introducing incentives for attaining status.
Posttest results.—Table 3 presents an across-condition test on consid-
erateness and authenticity by actor type moving from the no incentives
condition to the incentives condition. Because this is an across-condition
comparison we used a Mann-Whitney ðWilcoxonÞ U-test ðWilcoxon 1945;
Mann and Whitney 1947Þ, which is a generalized version of the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, established for comparisons across conditions. This test es-
sentially compares the sum total of each condition’s rankings ðUÞwith what
the sum total of rankings would be for each condition if the distributions did
not differ. Subjects’ attributions of considerateness for their own type are
lower ðz 5 23.27, P 5 .001, Mann-Whitney U-test5 .76Þ in the incentivesTABLE 3
Study 2 Posttest: High Status Denigration or Low Status Celebration?
CHANGE IN ATTRIBUTIONS FROM
NO INCENTIVES CONDITION TO
INCENTIVES CONDITION
MANN-WHITNEY U-TESTS COMPARING
ATTRIBUTIONS ACROSS CONDITIONS z-score P-value
Target of deference ðHSÞ . . . . . . . .
Considerateness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.268 .001
Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.453 <.001
Deferring party ðLSÞ . . . . . . . . . . .
Considerateness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.753 .080
Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.182 .856
NOTE.—Results comparing attributions of considerateness and authenticity on the same
type. The lower attributions of both considerateness and authenticity indicate a pattern of high-
status denigration. Conversely, the attributions of the deferring party or low-status type were
not higher across conditions for either considerateness ðlowerÞ or authenticity ðno differentÞ
indicating no low-status celebration. HS 5 high status; LS 5 low status.
529
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Alcondition when compared to similar attributions in the no incentives con-
dition. By contrast, attributions of considerateness for the other type were
not higher ðz521.75, P5 .08, Mann-Whitney U-test5 .64Þ across these
two conditions. Subjects’ attributions of authenticity for their own type are
lower ðz 5 24.45, P < .001, Mann-Whitney U-test 5 .85Þ when incentives
are introduced, while attributions of authenticity for the other type were
once again not higher ðz 5 20.18, P 5 .86, Mann-Whitney U-test 5 .51Þ
when comparing across these two conditions.
Posttest discussion.—These results indicate that when incentives for
attaining status are introduced, the high-performing social type or target of
this deference is attributed higher status, but denigrated with a decrease in
attributions of considerateness and authenticity. The combination of the
decrease in these scores for the high-performing social type and no change
in these attributions for the lower-performing social type reﬂects the idea
that high-status ðcategories ofÞ actors are denigrated ðconsidered morally
suspectÞ when status is observed through patterns of deference. We argue
that this reﬂects the fact that suspicions of inconsiderateness and inau-
thenticity are inherent in the status attainment process unless there is
credible evidence to override these suspicions. In study 2, we have shown
that these concerns can be overridden by credible prosocial behavior. In
study 3 we consider the role that objective measures, publicity for per-
formance, and the context in which competitions for status take place
interact to produce high-status denigration or celebration.Study 3: Objective Measures of Performance and Inferred Motivation
Purpose.—Studies 1 and 2 were designed to show how suspicions about
the status attainment process arise and can be overcome where status
emerges through patterns of deference. A second way in which status can
emerge is through public competition, including those where performance is
measured in an objective way. When status emerges in this way, it should
resolve concerns about true differences in capability, but our theory ðas
summarized in proposition CÞ holds that there are still contexts in which the
“denigration of heroes” can be expected to occur. As shown in study 2,
authenticity concerns can arise when there are ulterior motives for the
observed performance. Ulterior motives for performance create a concern
that the actor is more committed to the beneﬁts of status than they are to
performing for the audience. There are various ways in which the context
of the performance can lead to audience concern about ulterior motives.
Consider the sports industry, where status is often established through
public competitions, but sharp increases in pay for performance ðpartic-
ularly in professional baseball in the United StatesÞ created audience con-
cern that the players were more committed to themselves than the fans or530
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Denigration of Heroesthe game in general ðPreston 2004; Haupert 2007; Hahl 2013Þ. Beyond
economic rewards, status can also bring social rewards through publicity or
esteem from others. Those who attain status in these contexts ðby per-
forming higher than anotherÞ will be suspected of being less authentic than
those who do not. Contexts in which the audience is concerned that the
performance was motivated by instrumental ði.e., economic or socialÞ re-
ward will lead to lower attributions of authenticity for the higher performer
than for the lower performer even where performance differences are mea-
sured objectively.
Public competitions can also engender concern about the considerateness
of the high-status actor. Consider a status competition where two actors are
vying for higher-status positions. When this competition is public, it creates
the opportunity for the loser of the competition to lose face in the eyes of the
audience. As discussed above, in such competitions there are two potential
motivators for one competitor to seek to defeat another: ðaÞ to achieve a
performance that fulﬁlls the values that underlie the competition, whereby
the defeat of the rival is a side effect, and ðbÞ the humiliation of that rival. If
the nature of the competition is such that the outcomes from that compe-
tition are socially valued, audiences are more likely to infer that the defeat
of a rival is secondary to the desire to achieve such outcomes. However,
when the competition has no apparent social value, the only salient effect is
the public defeat of a rival. Instead of avoiding this outcome, by not putting
as much effort into the game or by giving the loser of the competition more
space to maintain his dignity, the higher-status actor will seem to have been
motivated by defeat of the rival.
HYPOTHESIS 3. When competitions are public and ðdo notÞ produce socially
valued outcomes, higher-performing actors will not only be regarded as higher
status but also as both more ðlessÞ authentic and more ðlessÞ considerate than
their lower-performing counterparts.
Description.—The key change in this study from studies 1 and 2 is how
audiences observe performance differences between the two actors ðQ2
type and S2 typeÞ. In the ﬁrst two studies, performance differences were
inferred through patterns of deference as one social type ðQ2Þ inﬂuenced
the other social type ðS2Þ to change his answer and defer to the other ðQ2Þ.
In study 3, subjects were again presented with two actors ðrepresenting
two social typesÞ competing on the same set of contrast sensitivity tasks.
Instead of having to come to a consensus, both actors presented their
answers independently and were then informed whether they were right or
wrong. Once again, a third actor was present, performing a slightly altered
role—subjects were informed that he ðcalled the “proctor”Þ was present to
assure that the “rules were followed in the game.” In each condition, the Q2
type was correct on all ﬁve of the tasks, while the S2 type was correct on531
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Alonly two of the tasks. This is similar to the previous study in which the S2
type deferred to the Q2 type in three out of the ﬁve tasks and they initially
agreed on the other two tasks. The difference, then, was that the audience
observed the difference in performance as objective instead of through
deference, or implied inﬂuence.
Subjects were once again assigned a type through the Klee and Kan-
dinsky painting preference. In this study, to maximize analysis power ðsam-
ple sizeÞ, all subjects were informed that they were a Q2 type ðthe type
represented by the higher-performing actor in the experimentÞ. The depen-
dent variables ðstatus, considerateness, and authenticityÞ were once again
measured the same and the tests performed on the differences in these at-
tributions for each social type were also the same as in the previous studies.
Finally, subjects for this studywere once again recruited throughAmazon’s
Mechanical Turk tool. For study 3, 139 out of a possible 173 were used in
the analysis ðfour subjects were not permitted to ﬁnish for answering the
attention questions incorrectly, and 30 did not ﬁnish the experimentÞ.
There were two manipulations in this study. The ﬁrst manipulation
varied whether there was a private incentive for performance. The second
manipulationwaswhether the outcomes for the observed performancewere
recognized as socially valued or whether the competition was simply trivial.
These manipulations are described below.
Public manipulation.—Subjects were randomly assigned to either a
public condition or private condition. In the private condition, subjects were
informed that results would be kept private and only known by each par-
ticipant. In this sense, the actors were not competing for status. In the public
condition, subjects were informed that the results would be posted publicly
and observed by at least 30 of their peers. This manipulation was meant to
trigger an ulterior motive for performance—that is, the public recognition
for higher performance or status—in the public as opposed to the private
condition.
Socially valued outcomes manipulation.—Subjects were also randomly
assigned to conditions in which the outcomes of the performance had social
value versus conditions in which there was no social value to the compe-
tition. In particular, in the charity conditions, subjects were informed that
each correct answer for a participant in the game would result in a $10
donation ðby the professorÞ to a local charity of the players’ choice. This
meant that differences in performance were attributed not just to actor
competence but to motivations to contribute to socially valued objectives.
These two manipulations created four distinct conditions: public/no char-
ity, public/charity, private/no charity, and private/charity. Thus study 3 was
a 2 ðpublic/privateÞ  2 ðsocially valued outcomes/trivial competitionÞ de-
sign. The key tests and results are shown within subjects and within each532
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Denigration of Heroescondition as we have done in the previous studies. This also allows us to see
main effects related to incentives and prosocial or socially valued outcomes.
Results.—Figure 3 shows the results of the standardized differences ðz-
scoreÞ in attributions between a higher-performing type and a lower-
performing type counterpart. The y-values are z-scores for differences in
attributions of status, considerateness, and authenticity. In the public/no
charity condition, subjects ðN 5 37Þ again attributed a typical member of
their own type more status than the other type ðz 5 5.02, P < .01Þ but at-
tributed less considerateness ðz523.82, P < .01Þ and less authenticity ðz5
23.59, P < .01Þ to the typical member of their own type compared to the
other type. By contrast, in the private/no charity condition, subjects ðN 5
33Þ attributed a typicalmember of their own ðhigher-performingÞ typemore
status than a typical member of the other ðlower-performingÞ type ðz 5FIG. 3.—Study 3: Objective measures and status attainment. This ﬁgure shows the
results of the standardized differences ðz-scoreÞ in attributions between the higher-
performing type and a lower-performing type counterpart. The y-values are z-scores for
differences in attributions of status, considerateness, and authenticity. The key variables
are whether the competition is linked with a private incentive ðpublic results/social re-
wardÞ and whether there is a recognized social value to the competition ðcharitable con-
tribution linked with performanceÞ. When there is no recognized social value and a pri-
vate incentive for performing, attributions of considerateness and authenticity are lower
for higher-performing actors ðdenigrationÞ. When there is recognized social value to the
performance but no private incentive ðfurthest to rightÞ attributions of considerateness
and authenticity are higher for higher-performing actors ðcelebrationÞ.
533
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Al4.96, P < .01Þ, while attributing a typical member of their own type essen-
tially the same considerateness ðz 5 0.65, P 5 .51Þ and authenticity ðz 5
1.35, P 5 .18Þ as a typical member of the other type. By contrast, in the
private/charity condition, subjects ðN 5 34Þ attributed a typical member
of their own ðhigher-performingÞ type more status than a typical member
of the other ðlower-performingÞ type ðz 5 5.04, P < .01Þ, and attributed a
typical member of their own type higher considerateness ðz5 3.68, P < .01Þ
and authenticity ðz 5 2.31, P 5 .02Þ than a typical member of the other
type. And ﬁnally, in the public/charity condition, subjects ðN 5 35Þ at-
tributed a typical member of their own type both more status ðz 5 4.62,
P < .01Þ and more considerateness ðz 5 2.03, P 5 .04Þ to the typical
member of their own type even while they attributed less authenticity ðz5
22.82, P < .01Þ to their own type compared to the other type. We refer to
this last condition as a “mixed signals” condition, as it mixes an incentive
for pursuing status ðdue to the publicness of the competitionÞ with the fact
that the competition has social value ðsince some of the proceeds go to
charityÞ.
Table 4 shows pairwise correlations between considerateness and au-
thenticity. While considerateness and authenticity are positively correlated
in all conditions, the correlation is weakest in the mixed signals condition.
Table 5 shows two OLS regressions for each condition describing the rela-
tionship between the differences in status and considerateness ðmodel 1Þ and
the differences in status and authenticity ðmodel 2Þ. In the private incentive/
no charity condition ðfurthest leftÞ, these differences are negatively corre-
lated: greater positive differences attributed to actor types in status ðhigh-
performing social type > low-performing social typeÞ were correlated with
larger negative differences between actor types in both considerateness and
authenticity ðlow-performing social type > high-performing social typeÞ. InTABLE 4
Study 3: Correlations between Attributions of
Considerateness and Authenticity
Socially Recognized Value
Public Performance
ðResults Posted PubliclyÞ
Private Performance
ðResults Remain PrivateÞ
No ðno charityÞ . . . . . . . .921*** .572***
Yes ðcharityÞ . . . . . . . . . .203* .567***
NOTE.—Correlations between considerateness and authenticity for each condition. While
considerateness and authenticity are positively correlated in all conditions, the correlation is
weakest in the condition where signals are mixed: socially valued outcome ðcharityÞ and private
incentive ðposted publiclyÞ.
* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
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Althe public/charity condition, higher attributions of status were correlated
with lower attributions of authenticity but had no statistically signiﬁcant
relationship with differences in considerateness. In the private/no charity
condition, there was no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between these
differences. Finally, in the private/charity condition, higher attributions of
status were correlated with higher attributions of both considerateness and
authenticity.
Table 6 is an additional analysis using OLS regression techniques to
observe the main effect of incentives and socially valued outcomes. The
presence of incentives results in greater negative differences in consider-
ateness and authenticity ðhigher-performing social type < lower-performing
social typeÞ. In addition, associating the competition with socially valued
outcomes ðcharitable contributionsÞ results in greater positive differences of
both considerateness and authenticity ðhigher-performing social type >
lower-performing social typeÞ.
Discussion.—These results show that the context in which status is
achieved can inﬂuence whether the high-status social type is denigrated or
celebrated, even when status hierarchies are validated through objective
measures of performance. When there was a status incentive for high per-
formance and the competition was trivial in nature, the winner of the com-
petition is attributed higher status but is denigrated with lower attributions
of both considerateness and authenticity. When the competition is trivial,
but there is no status incentive, there is no denigration, nor is there cele-
bration of those higher-performing types. We spend more time below dis-TABLE 6
Study 3: Incentives/Charity Main Effect
ALL SUBJECTS
Considerateness Difference Authenticity Difference
Public performance . . . . . . . . . . 21.050*** 21.588***
ð.299Þ ð.270Þ
Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.767*** .582**
ð.299Þ ð.270Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .025 .598***
ð.350Þ ð.316Þ
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Adjusted R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 .20
NOTE.—This table is an analysis of how inserting public ðincentivesÞ or socially valued out-
comes ðcharityÞ affects differences in considerateness and authenticity across all subjects in study
3. OLS regression techniques were used. Incentives and charity are dichotomous variables rep-
resenting randomly assigned conditions. Results are coefﬁcients with SEs in parentheses.
* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
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Denigration of Heroescussing the results from the “mixed signals” condition in which there was
a socially valued outcome, but the competition was public. Finally, when
outcomes related to the competition are socially valued and there is no in-
centive to pursue status, there is no reason for the audience to assume that
the higher-performing type is less considerate or less authentic than the
lower-performing type. Once we have eliminated the concerns inherent to
the status attainment process, the audience is free to celebrate the higher-
performing type with higher attributions of status, considerateness, and
authenticity.
The results from table 6 more directly validate hypothesis 3. First, these
results show that when there are incentives for attaining status ðsocial re-
ward associated with publicly posting the resultsÞ, the higher-performing
social type is considered less authentic because it is unclear whether they are
motivated by the competition or simply the rewards. Second, these results
show that when the competition for status is associated with socially valued
outcomes, that the higher-performing type is considered less authentic than
the lower-performing type. While these results constitute strong evidence
for our theory, in the following analysis we also show how the context in
which status is attained affects the inferencesmade about high-status actors.
Motive inference analysis.—The setup of this study allowed us to
perform an additional analysis to understand what drives attributions of
inconsiderateness and inauthenticity separately. As summarized in prop-
osition D, we expect that in general, attributions of considerateness and
authenticity move in the same direction. Overall, our analysis of the corre-
lations between these constructs showed that attributions were positively
correlated across all conditions and studies. However, we argue that there
are distinct reasons why we should expect that certain features of the status
attainment process should lead to concerns about considerateness and
authenticity. In particular, we argue that concerns about authenticity are
triggered when it is clear that there are incentives for attaining status—
where incentives to attain status are clear, those who are attributed higher
status are also attributed lower authenticity because of concerns about
ulterior motives for performance. We also argued that concerns about
considerateness would be related to perceptions that the high-status actor
shows little concern for the dignity of another in attaining status—either
because of the trivial nature of the contest or when deference patterns were
not accompanied by prosocial signals.
Each of these attributions is driven by inferences made by observers
about the motivations of the higher-performing social type. We measured
these inferences in this study in order to better understand the mechanisms
behind each type of attribution. In order to measure inferred motivation,
subjects randomly assigned to the public conditions were also asked to rate
on a scale of 1 ðlowÞ to 7 ðhighÞ the likelihood that the Q2 ðhigher performerÞ537
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Aland S2 ðlower performerÞ were motivated by “the publicity related to the
competition.” Subjects randomly assigned to the charity conditions were
also asked to rate on a scale of 1 ðlowÞ to 7 ðhighÞ the likelihood that the Q2
ðhigher performerÞ and S2 ðlower performerÞ were motivated by the char-
itable contributions related to the competition. In this analysis, we focus
solely on the inferred motivations of the higher-performing type ðQ2Þ.
Of the conditions in study 3, the public/charity condition was interesting
in that it showed mixed results: positive differences in considerateness and
negative differences in authenticity. This condition serves as an interesting
setting in which to understand the effect of the mixed signals ðhigher in-
centive to pursue status, as well as higher incentive to promote social valueÞ
and to tease out the inferred motivations behind each type of attribution. We
expect that variation in how subjects resolved the inference problem ex-
plains the divergence in attributions between considerateness and authen-
ticity. In particular, the more a subject inferred that the high-performing
type was motivated by the charitable contribution, the more positive are
differences in attributions of considerateness ðbetween the two typesÞ. Con-
versely, the more a subject inferred that the high-performing type was mo-
tivated by the publicity of the contest, the more negative are differences in
attributions of authenticity ðbetween the two typesÞ.
Table 7 shows the results of a multivariate regression comparing inferred
motivations with differences in attributions of considerateness and authen-
ticity. The column on the left shows the effect of perceived motive on dif-
ference in considerateness. Changes in inferences about being motivated by
publicity have no effect on differences in considerateness, but a one unit
increase in the strength of audience inferences that the actor was motivated
by publicity leads to a .5 unit decrease in the difference ðor increase in the
negative differenceÞ between the high- and low-performing type’s authen-
ticity. By contrast, a one unit increase in the strength of inferred motivation
related to charity is correlated with a one unit increase ðhigh-performing
social type > low-performing social typeÞ in the difference in attributions of
considerateness.
These results indicate that the difference in attributions of consider-
ateness and authenticity between the higher- and lower-performing types
was driven by differences in inferred motivations. A key ﬁnding in this
table is the negative correlation between inferences of the publicity motive
and the charity motive. This negative correlation indicates that subjects
tended to resolve the inference problem by deciding either that the socially
valued outcomes or the publicity motivated the performance, but that both
could not be operating simultaneously ðeven though this is theoretically
possibleÞ. Where the subject inferred that the high-status actor might have
been inspired by the social rewards, they attributed less authenticity to the538
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TABLE 7
Study 3: Mechanism Analysis: Subjects’ Inferences about Motive and
Attributions of Considerateness and Authenticity
MIXED SIGNALS: CHARITY AND PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE CONDITION
Considerateness Difference Authenticity Difference
Publicity motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .038 2.543***
ð.139Þ ð.142Þ
Charity motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .938*** 2.026
ð.137Þ ð.140Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.334*** 2.008*
ð1.133Þ ð1.157Þ
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Adjusted R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 .34
Correlation: publicity motive—charity
motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.523***
NOTE.—The table shows only the condition with both the public and socially valued out-
comes. Differences in considerateness are contingent on subjects assuming that charity is what
motivates the higher-performing actor ðhigher values for charity motive are correlated with
more positive differences in consideratenessÞ. Differences in authenticity are contingent on
subjects assuming that publicity is what motivates the higher-performing actor ðhigher values
for publicity motive are correlated with more negative differences in consideratenessÞ. Below,
the table shows that the publicity motive and charity motive were negatively correlated
ðhigher values for one meant lower values for the otherÞ. Results are coefﬁcients with SEs in
parentheses.
* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
Denigration of Heroeshigher-performing social type than the to lower-performing type. When the
subject inferred that the high-performing type was motivated by charity,
they attributed higher levels of considerateness to the higher-performing
type than to the lower-performing type. The key is not whether the audi-
ence is willing to give them the beneﬁt of the doubt, but how the context
inﬂuences whether the audience assumes a prosocial motivation or an
instrumental motivation. The key ﬁnding from this conditions is that the
inference made about the motivation of the high-performing social type
determines whether the high-status actor is celebrated or denigrated.DISCUSSION
The experimental results presented in this article validate our explanation
of the common tendency to denigrate those in high-status positions. We
have suggested that this puzzle should command our interest insofar as ðaÞ
the observers who denigrate a high-status social category are themselves
members of that category and ðbÞ the denigration occurs despite the absence539
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Alof problematic behavior. Moreover, the “denigration of heroes” under these
conditions is, at ﬁrst blush, difﬁcult to reconcile with the notion that status is
conferred on the basis of prosocial behavior, as represented by such moral
heroes as Raoul Wallenberg or Mother Teresa. Our theory resolves this
puzzle. We argue and show how the incentives associated with status at-
tainment can lead an audience to suspect high-status actors of inauthen-
ticity because of the beneﬁts accorded to these actors. While status is at-
tributed because of recognized performance valued by an audience, the
very fact that the attainment of status confers beneﬁts raises the suspicion
that high-status actors pursue their self-interest over that of the audience.
Indeed, the salience of such suspicions is such that even attempts to resolve
this concern through prosocial behavior are ineffective when an incentive
for this behavior is known. Furthermore, the nature of the interaction
processes through which status is attained raises suspicions regarding the
high-status social type’s warmth or considerateness for others. This is
because deference entails inspiring a loss of dignity of another in order to
attain and maintain this valued position. The implication is that the un-
derlying motivation that threatens both the perceived authenticity and con-
siderateness of a high-status actor is one of placing self before others, a
perception that calls the actor’s moral character into question. Our ﬁndings
support the argument that status attainment, by itself, leads to ðprivateÞ
denigration of high-status actors.
The ﬁndings of this study cast serious doubt on the most prominent
explanation for this phenomenon in either the sociological or psychological
literatures: the “compensation hypothesis” ðe.g., Judd et al. 2005; Yzerbyt
et al. 2008Þ. Judd and colleagues ð2005; Yzerbyt et al. 2008Þ argue that
attributions of lower morality to high-status actors stem from a psycho-
logical motivation to see the world as just. This motivation is said to cause
people to compensate the losers in status competition by attributing greater
moral worth to them. The individual is thought to achieve a sense of justice
by making up for an imbalance on one dimension of worth ðstatusÞ with a
corresponding imbalance on another dimension of worth ðmoralityÞ.
Even if one disregards the experimental results of this study, which cast
serious doubt on this mechanism, there are at least three interlocking the-
oretical difﬁculties with this theory. The ﬁrst theoretical difﬁculty is that the
very literature from which this argument derives, system justiﬁcation the-
ory ðJost and Banaji 1994; Kay, Jimenez, and Jost 2002; cf. Lerner 1980Þ,
also suggests that individuals can satisfy their need for justice with a very
different psychological process that would not involve compensating low-
status actors with greatermorality. This alternative logic, described as being
related to the Protestant work ethic ðsee Kay and Jost 2003Þ, is particularly
noteworthy because it helps explain why low-status actors tend to accept
their low status. In particular, this theory suggests that individuals satisfy540
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Denigration of Heroestheir need to believe that the world is just by understanding patterns of
social inequality as reﬂecting deserved rewards on the parts of the actors
ðKay and Jost 2003, p. 824Þ. Thus, given the fact that the motivation to see
the world as just can be met by regarding the status hierarchy as fair, it is
unclear why high-status actors would instead compensate low-status actors
by attributing greater morality to them.
Moreover, such compensation seems to assume a level of altruism that is
rarely seen. It is far-fetched to believe that people will denigrate their own
category just to balance out another category’s lower status when there is no
evidence to support such denigration. By denigrating one’s own category,
the high-status actor is placing value on another group at the expense of his
own, implicating all members of the category. While individuals may have
a psychological motivation to see the world as just, and this might even
cause them to want to compensate losers in status competitionwith victories
on other dimensions of worth, it is unclear why this need would systemat-
ically overwhelm more selﬁsh motives ðsee Simpson and Willer 2008Þ.
Beyond these theoretical difﬁculties, our experimental results cast doubt
upon the “compensation theory” and support our “suspicious attainment”
theory. As found in study 2, there is no evidence of a tendency to compensate
low-status categories when observers see credible evidence that status was
attained in a “prosocial” or morally virtuous way ðstudy 2, no incentives
conditionÞ or when the context of the competition for status is such that
there are private incentives to display higher competence than another
ðstudy 3, private conditionÞ.
Finally, and perhaps key to our puzzle, a problemwith the “compensation
theory” is that it cannot explain why high-status actors are sometimes cel-
ebrated for their morality, as we saw very clearly in the private/charity
condition of study 3. If it is the case that there is a psychological motivation
to compensate low-status actors with higher attributions of considerateness
ðand authenticityÞ, then we should always see this negative relationship
between status and any other dimension of worth. But as discussed in the
introduction, it is clear that there are actors who gain high status precisely
because of their moral virtue ðWiller 2009Þ. Moral heroes such as Mother
Teresa or Raoul Wallenberg cannot be explained by a theory that assumes
a psychological need to balance status hierarchies with moral hierarchies.
By contrast, such cases are well understood by sociological theory, which
recognizes that audiences confer status on the basis of some combination
of actors’ capabilities and their commitment to use those capabilities on
behalf of the audience ðCorrell and Benard 2006; Phillips et al. 2013; see,
e.g., Ridgeway 1981Þ. This logic has recently been extended to suggest that
actors who engage in selﬂess “prosocial” activities receive more deference
relative to those who work only on their own behalf ðWiller 2009Þ. Con-
versely, scandals leading to the loss of status are likely to erupt where it is541
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Alrevealed that a high-status actor has falsiﬁed his performance ðe.g., doping
scandals in sports, scientiﬁc fraudÞ or has betrayed the audience by serving
himself ðe.g., embezzlementÞ or rival groups ðe.g., treason; Adut 2008;
Phillips et al. 2013Þ. Consistent with this perspective, in ﬁndings from study
2, we see that when observers see credible evidence that status was attained
in a “prosocial” or morally virtuous way and where the context of the com-
petition was such that there were private incentives or ðstudy 3, private
conditionsÞ that high-status actors are at least rated no different than the low-
status categories of actors on these dimensions of morality.
But while such sociological theory can explain cases where status is a
function of morality, it has offered no explanation for the apparent con-
tradiction that high-status actors are often denigrated as immoral. As such,
our theory extends existing sociological theory by developing it further to
explain the conditions under which celebration or denigration of high-
status actors can occur. Instead of suggesting that exhibiting prosocial
behavior is the only way that actors earn status ðe.g., Fragale et al. 2011Þ
our theory recognizes that there are many ways in which status can be
attained and each can vary on the amount of prosocial signals that can be
displayed. In particular, our theory relies on the premise that the display of
prosocial behavior is a sufﬁcient but not necessary condition of status
attainment. In general, actors earn status from public recognition of their
competence and their commitment ðto use such capabilityÞ toward the
beneﬁt of the audience ðRidgeway 1982; Phillips et al. 2013Þ. Displays of
prosocial behavior provide evidence of such commitment. But in many
cases, evidence of capability and commitment must be derived from actors’
relative performance and from the deference that they receive, ostensibly
due to such performance. We argue and show that the manner in which
status is attained, including the level of ambiguity around sincere prosocial
sentiment, determines whether a high-status actor’s moral character is
either denigrated or celebrated.
Three related implications of our study are worth noting. First, our
theory and results potentially shed light on why audiences often quickly
subvert status hierarchies when faced with evidence that supports these
suspicions. Consider how rare it is to ﬁnd the actor who forever overcomes
these concerns à la Mother Teresa or Raoul Wallenberg. Adut’s ð2008Þ
work on scandals shows that public denigration of high-status actors hap-
pens only when there is a level of common knowledge: everyone knows
that everyone else knows that these erstwhile heroes should be denigrated.
Our ﬁndings suggest that there may often be an underlying ðprivately heldÞ
concern about the morality of the high-status social type created by sus-
picions that status was gained in inauthentic or cold ways. As long as these
suspicions remain private or unproven, the status hierarchy remains sup-542
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Denigration of Heroesported. However, audiences are willing to turn heroes into villains when
their concerns become validated. These high-status insecurities suggest the
presence of a soft underbelly to status hierarchies; the willingness to ðpri-
vatelyÞ denigrate high-status actors makes possible the rapid transitions
from public celebration to scandal.
Second, the fact that attaining status leads to concerns about the moral
character of the high-status actor can also help explain why high-status
actors are often not penalized for poor expressions of capability, but are
less immune to concerns about their commitment ðPhillips et al. 2013Þ.
Recent work on constraints to high-status positions has shown that the
increased attention given to those in high-status positions puts them at risk
of falling from these lofty perches ðGrafﬁn et al. 2013Þ. It is worth noting,
however, that in these studies status loss occurs when evidence about
selﬁsh behavior comes to light ðWade et al. 2006; Grafﬁn et al. 2013; cf.
Adut 2008Þ, but evidence of weakened capability can be overlooked ðcf.
Bothner, Kim, and Smith 2011Þ. Because the status attainment process,
unless associated with evidence of prosocial behavior, brings with it sus-
picions about an actor’s interest in beneﬁting from these positions, audi-
ences are often concerned about whether the actor is more loyal to the
audience or to themselves. In other words, audiences can appreciate a
high-status actor’s performance but can also doubt that the commitment
shown to them in this instance will not be turned against them if the
incentives change. Thus, audiences often celebrate an actor’s successful
performance, but when presented with evidence that increases concern
about the high-status actor’s ðlack ofÞ commitment, audiences can penalize
the high performer ðHahl 2013Þ.
Finally, the realization that high-status actors, despite public acknowl-
edgment that they carry high levels of both capability and commitment, are
held under suspicion as lacking authenticity or considerateness can also help
explain why, at times, high-status actors are seen aligning themselves with
low-status culture ðHahl, Zuckerman, and Kim 2014Þ. When high-status
actors attain their positions in ways that do not refute the concerns that the
status was truly earned, they are suspected of lacking considerateness and
authenticity. Because their lower-status counterparts have not gained status,
they are not held suspect on these dimensions. As a result these low-status
actors tend to be attributed higher levels of considerateness and authenticity
than the high-status actor. A high-status actor who can appropriate the sym-
bols of this low-status culture, without threatening his own status, might be
able to soften his image through the positive attributions of morality that
come with such adoptions. This can help explain why we see high-status
actors consuming low-status culture ðe.g., Bryson 1996; Martin 1998; Grazian
2005; Strausbaugh 2006Þ and displaying images or activities normally re-543
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Alserved for low-status actors ðe.g., Halle 1996; Grounds 2001; Johnston and
Baumann 2007; Hahl and Gosline 2012Þ. Doing so allows the high-status
actor to appropriate the low-status culture’s high levels of authenticity and
considerateness and presents an image less fraught with these same morality
concerns.
That there is a need for high-status actors to resolve denigration con-
cerns by engaging in prosocial activities, or presenting prosocial symbols in
the way described above, was acknowledged in previous literature on
emerging roles and specialization in task groups ðe.g., Bales 1955; Slater
1955Þ. This work suggested that when leaders emerge in task groups they
can be disliked if they are seen to claim their role simply because they take
on extra work and not on the basis of competence. In response, work by
Burke and colleagues ð1968; Gallagher and Burke 1974Þ argues that
because of this concern for legitimacy of the leader, the group is more
effective when another person in the group takes on the role of “socio-
emotional” leader while supporting the task leader. This work can be seen
as consistent with our theory in that these researchers acknowledge that a
potential source of disliking task group leaders comes from how these
emergent go-getters can appear to seek after this role through status at-
tainment, which, we add, raises questions about motives and concern for
others. While they suggest a need for specialization in the competence and
prosocial tasks, our ﬁndings suggest that there is no need for specialization
of this sort when the leader can present prosocial behavior to his audience,
thereby, resolving the denigration concerns on his own.CONCLUSION
In summary, the common tendency to ðprivatelyÞ denigrate our heroes by
attributing lower levels of morality ðconsiderateness and authenticityÞ to
actors in high-status positions derives from suspicions that arise inherent to
the process of status attainment. Because status confers beneﬁts to the
holder, the high-status actor, while publicly acknowledged as acting in
concert with group interest, tends to appear inauthentic in its commitment
to serve the group interest above self-interest. Because deference patterns,
through which audiences observe status, entail both claims to superiority
and afﬁrmation of inferiority, a target of deference tends to be seen as
harming the deferring party by beneﬁting from another’s loss of dignity.
Audiences will infer insincere or inconsiderate motives unless high-status
actors are seen as credibly prosocial and selﬂess in support of the group’s
goals, without the clear potential of ulterior motives for these displays.
Thus, the status attainment process raises suspicions that can either be
fulﬁlled with common knowledge of inauthentic or inconsiderate behavior
or overcome with common knowledge of credible prosocial behavior.544
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Status Questions: Cronbach’s alpha 5 .854
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
respect?
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
prestige?
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
competence?
“Considerateness” questions: Cronbach’s alpha 5 .838
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
likability?
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
considerateness?
“Authenticity” questions: Cronbach’s alpha 5 .82
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
authenticity?
How would most people rate the typical Q2 ðS2Þ member on measures of
sincerity?APPENDIX B
Example of Plain Assertive versus Prosocial Assertive Text for Study 1
Example of Plain Assertive Dialogue
Condition Dialogue for Disagreement 1:
Q2 Male: I am pretty sure black covers the most space.
S2 Male: I thought it might be white. Are you sure?
Q2 Male: It feels right—let’s say black.
S2 Male: OK
Commentator: I agree with Q2, let’s choose black.
Example of Prosocial Assertive Dialogue
Condition Dialogue for Disagreement 1:
Q2 Male: I am pretty sure black covers the most space.
S2 Male: I thought it might be white. Are you sure?
Q2 Male: Why did you think white?
S2 Male: It seemed like there was a chunk of white right in the middle that
stuck out to me.
Q2 Male: I can see that logic. But measuring on the middle might be mis-
leading because your eyes will be drawn to the big chunks of color. I chose
black because there were long strips of it along the sides. Does that make
sense?545
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Commentator: I agree with Q2, let’s choose black.APPENDIX C
Study 2
Incentives ConditionIntroduction to the team task.—We presented a “contrast sensitivity
task” to teams of three people. Each team’s objective was to come to a
decision about the correct answer on the presented task. Each team had
to decide on only one answer. After answering the question by them-
selves, the team members discussed among the group and came to a con-
sensus.
The teams were informed that they would receive a reward based on
the number of questions they got correct. One correct answer won them
$25 and each correct answer after that doubled the total amount they won.
For instance, two correct answers won them $50, three won them $100,
four won them $200, and if they got all ﬁve correct they would win $400 to
split among the three of them.
Additionally, it has been shown that teams are more effective when they
elicit a full range of opinion from their members. Teams were allocated a
“teamworkbonus” based on howwell they fulﬁll these criteria. We explain
how this was allocated later in the description. Teams were informed up
front that this “teamwork bonus” was possible. Furthermore, they were
informed, in general terms, the criteria on which this bonus would be
allocated.No Incentives ConditionIntroduction to the team task.—We presented a “contrast sensitivity
task” to teams of three people. Each team’s objective was to come to a
decision about the correct answer on the presented task. Each team had
to decide on only one answer. After answering the question by them-
selves, the team members discussed among the group and came to a con-
sensus.
The teams were informed that they would receive a reward based on the
number of questions they got correct. One correct answer won them $25
and each correct answer after that doubled the total amount they won. For
instance, two correct answers won them $50, three won them $100, four
won them $200, and if they got all ﬁve correct they would win $400 to split
among the three of them.546
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elicit a full range of opinion from their members. Teams were allocated a
“teamwork bonus” based on how well they fulﬁll these criteria. We ex-
plain how this was allocated later in the description. Teams were NOT
informed up front that this “teamwork bonus” was possible, nor were
they informed the criteria on which this bonus would be allocated.
APPENDIX D
S2/Q2 Manipulation Check: In-Group Bias or the “Sour Grapes” EffectSince all subjects in the studies discussed above were assigned to the
higher-status type, these studies demonstrate that lower attributions of
considerateness and authenticity cannot be explained simply by in-group
bias. While our primary puzzle centered on why actors might at times
negatively relate status with considerateness and authenticity within their
own type, our design allows us to examine the effects of the in-group “sour
grapes” argument. In fact, if our manipulation of audience status did not
take, and for some reason all subjects identiﬁed more readily with the less
competent ðdeferring partyÞ type, then these results might be explained by
in-group bias. Because we relied heavily on designs established in the mere
difference line of literature ðTajfel et al. 1971; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000;
Ridgeway and Correll 2006Þ, we are conﬁdent that our status manipu-
lation was effective. To be sure, we used a concentration question in each
study to assure that only those subjects who knew which type they were
assigned ðQ2 or S2Þ were included in the study. Only three subjects across
all three studies did not answer this question correctly. Nonetheless, we ana-
lyzed results of studies from the perspective of the deferring party ðS2Þ to
serve as our own manipulation check.
The rest of this appendix discusses how results on similar studies from
the perspective of the less competent type subjects serve as a manipulation
check on the attempt to assure that both groups did not automatically
identify with the S2 or deferring party type. Showing the manipulation
within these results is tricky because our argument suggests that the neg-
ative relationship between attributions of status and attributions of con-
siderateness and authenticity is driven primarily by a cognitive mecha-
nism that leads to suspicion simply because of the position of the actor in
question. As such, we expect little difference between the results from the
target of deference ðQ2Þ and deferring party ðS2Þ types for most of the
studies. We expect that in-group bias will be most visible in studies where
the high-status actors were not expected to be denigrated. In other words,
there should be some dampening of the positive effects for prosocial
activities engaged in by the high-status actor.547
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We replicated the study 1 assertive prosocial condition, but from the “de-
ferring party” audience perspective. We also replicated both conditions of
study 2, again from the “deferring party” audience perspective. We expect
that the deferring party audience will be less willing to accept these pro-
social signals, resulting in the persistence of a negative relationship between
status and considerateness for the deferring party audience results.Comparison of Prosocial Effect for “Deferring Party” Type Audience
Figure D1 shows the results for the manipulation check studies. In study 1,
prosocial condition, subjects randomly assigned to the deferring party type
ðN 5 26Þ attributed a typical member of the other group more status than
their own group ðz 5 4.22, P < .01Þ but attributed lower levels of consid-
erateness ðz 5 21.71, P 5 .09Þ to the other type and essentially the same
levels of authenticity ðz 5 20.72, P 5 .47Þ to teach type. In the study 2
conditions, subjects randomly assigned to the deferring party type ðN5 18Þ
in the no incentives condition, attributed more status ðz 5 3.04, P < .01Þ toFIG. D1.—Manipulation check: Prosocial conditions for subjects randomly assigned
to the “deferring party” type. Results, when compared with similar conditions of target of
deference types, show an in-group bias as prosocial behavior has a weaker effect on
correcting negative attributions of considerateness and authenticity of high-status actors.
548
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Denigration of Heroesthe other type compared with the typical member of their own group but
attributed essentially the same considerateness ðz 5 20.64, P 5 .52Þ and
authenticity ðz5 0.99, P5 .32Þ to the other type compared to its own type.
In the incentives condition where incentives were known, subjects ran-
domly assigned to the deferring party type ðN 5 27Þ also attributed higher
status ðz 5 2.37, P 5 .02Þ to the other type above that attributed to their
own type but attributed lower considerateness ðz 5 22.13, P 5 .03Þ and
authenticity ðz522.24,P5 .02Þ to the other type comparedwith their own
type.In-Group Effects Discussion
The key patterns provide further support for our theory. When prosocial
signals are observed without incentives for this behavior ðstudy 2 rep-
licationÞ, there is essentially no difference in considerateness or authen-
ticity attributions between their own and the other group. Recall that in
study 1 above, the high-status subjects attributed the same amount of con-
siderateness between their own type and the lower-status type when pro-
social behavior was observed. By contrast, in the replication of this con-
dition, the deferring party continued to attribute more considerateness to
their own lower-status type even when these same prosocial signals were
observed. In all, these results support the “sour grapes” or in-group effect,
which is also evidence that our manipulation, following the minimal group
or mere difference tradition, was effective.549
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First-Order versus Third-Order ResultsFIG. E1.—This ﬁgure shows results from the plain assertive condition in study 1. On
the left side, the subjects were asked the dependent variable in a ﬁrst-order way ð“how
would you rate . . . ”Þ, and on the right side we present the results from the previously
reported third-order questions ð“how would most people rate . . .”Þ. The results show no
difference in the negative relationship whether it was ﬁrst or third order.
550
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FIG. E2.—This ﬁgure shows results from the public/no charity condition in study 3.
On the left side, the subjects were asked the dependent variable in a ﬁrst-order way
ð“how would you rate . . .”Þ, and on the right side we present the results from the
previously reported third-order questions ð“how would most people rate . . .”Þ. The re-
sults show no difference in the negative relationship whether it was ﬁrst or third order.
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